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LEARNING-BY-DOING, MARKET STRUCTURE 
AND INDUSTRIAL AND TRADE POLICIES* 
By PARTHA DASGUPTA and JOSEPH STIGLITZ 
"Anything that we have to learn to do we learn by the actual doing of it: people 
become builders by building and instrumentalists by playing instruments." 
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, tr. by J. A. K. Thomson, Penguin Books 
(London), 1976, p. 63. 
1. Introduction 
LEARNING FROM experience is important in many industries, most especially 
in the early stages of their history. Productivity increases are realised not 
only as a result of the explicit allocation of resources to capital accumulation 
and research and development, but also often as a by-product of the process 
of production; that is, learning-by-doing.1 
Learning gives rise to a special kind of intertemporal externality in 
production. It was used as an argument for the protection of infant 
industries, the idea being that in the absence of public intervention a 
domestic infant industry capable of learning would be stifled by foreign 
competition. (For an excellent presentation of the analysis and its limita- 
tions, see Baldwin, 1969, Wan and Clemhout, 1970 and Negishi, 1972). 
To the best of our knowledge the literature developing the "infant- 
industry agrument" has supposed invariably that foreign manufacturers 
form a competitive industry and that learning has ceased there. Thus, the 
focus of concern is domestic learning.2 But the literature would appear to 
have a central weakness: it has not explored how learning possibilities affect 
the structure of domestic industry. Without some understanding of this one 
cannot discuss appropriate government policies. The central purpose of this 
article is to study this issue and to analyse a few distinguished industrial and 
trade policies in the light of our findings. 
* Research towards this article was initiated during the spring of 1984, while the authors were 
Visiting Professors at the Department of Economics, Stanford University and the Hoover 
Institution, Stanford, respectively, and it was completed while Dasgupta was Visiting Professor 
at Harvard University and Visitor to the National Bureau of Economic Research during the 
spring of 1987. We are most grateful to these institutions for making our visits both possible 
and greatly enjoyable, to Paul David for many stimulating conversations on the subject matter 
of this essay, and to Gene Grossman, Tim Kehoe, Kala Krishna, Eric Maskin, Hamid 
Sabourian and Mike Whinston and the referees of this journal for their incisive comments on 
an earlier draft. Financial support from the UK Economic and Social Research Council and the 
US National Science Foundation has made possible continuation of our research on 
technological change and market structure. 
1 Empirical studies of learning curves include the illuminating works of Asher (1956) and 
Alchian (1963) on airframe production, Zimmerman (1983) on nuclear power technologies and 
Lieberman (1984) on production and investment in chemical process industries. Hollander 
(1965) has investigated the phenomenon of learning in the technology of R&D. 
2 We are confining our attention to that part of the infant-industry literature which bases its 
argument on learning-by-doing, and are ignoring other reasons that have been invoked, such as 
inter-firm externalities unconnected with learning, and labour and capital market distortions. 
For a summary of these arguments see Haberler (1987). 
( Oxford University Press 1988 
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Learning-by-doing involves a form of sunk cost. Production, leading to a 
gain in experience, is the cost which is sunk. Learning therefore manifests 
itself as an irreversibility in production possibilities. A key to our own 
analysis here will be a related feature, which is that unless learning spills 
over completely, instantaneously and costlessly among all rival production 
units, or unless at each date every unit faces strong diminishing returns to 
scale in production at some output levels, there are social wastes in having 
more than one production unit. In short, the industry is a natural monopoly. 
To see this, suppose that an industry in which production units have the 
potential for learning is socially managed. Suppose also that learning does 
not spill over completely. Suppose too that the average production cost 
faced by a production unit at any date is independent of its scale of 
operation at that date. In these circumstances it is socially preferable to 
have a single production unit producing specified amounts over time than to 
have two production units, each producing half the industry output at each 
date. The point is that in the latter case each unit learns less. This is a form 
of dynamic scale-economies in production and it suggests that if the industry 
were instead in the private sector it would assume an oligopolistic structure, 
not a competitive one; at least in the initial stages, when the scope for 
learning is large. 
This much is plain enough. What is perhaps not so plain is the possibility 
that firm-specific learning encourages the growth of industrial concentration. 
To be specific, one expects that strong learning possibilities, coupled with 
vigorous comptetition among rivals, ensures that history matters (see 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969)), in the sense that if a given firms enjoys some 
initial advantages over its rivals it can, by undercutting them, capitalise on 
these advantages in such a way that the advantages accumulate over time, 
rendering rivals incapable of offering effective competition in the long run, 
unless they enter with technological innovations, or unless learning declines 
in its vigour.3 Putting it another way, production of final output, one 
imagines, can itself be used as a preemptive move on the part of a firm to 
deter rivals from entering an industry or, in other circumstances, to make it 
less and less profitable for rivals to remain in an industry. Putting it in yet 
another way, 'learning' may well be used for the creation of entry-barriers, 
(see Scherer, 1980, pp. 250-252), or in other circumstances be used for 
discouraging rivals to remain in the industry. Whether this is a possibility 
depends upon whether the scope for learning is large and upon whether 
firms are far-sighted; but in ways that may not be obvious at first blush. The 
point is that even if the scope for learning is large at initial stages it must 
eventually become negligible: unit cost of production is, after all, bounded 
3For a mathematical exploration of this view in a more general context, see Arthur (1983) 
and Arthur, Eromoliev and Kaniovski (1986). The late Gunnar Myrdal, Paul David and the 
late Nicholas Kaldor have emphasised this point of view in their writings on cumulative 
causation occurring in certain kinds of path-dependent processes. See e.g. Myrdal (1957), 
David (1985, 1987) and Kaldor (1985). The idea of cumulative causation has, of course, been 
central in evolutionary biology. For an excellent account, see Dawkins (1986, chapter 8). 
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below by zero. Thus, if oligopolists are far-sighted the scope for preemption 
on the part of advantaged firms is low because disadvantaged firms know 
that if they are patient and produce enough there will be oligopoly profits to 
be enjoyed in the distant future. But if firms discount the future at a large 
rate this argument would not appeal and the industry could then display 
growing concentration. 
It is because of these presuppositions that one suspects in advance that 
the analyses of oligopolistic industries in the presence of learning-by-doing 
in Spence (1981) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) are misleading. These 
authors, first of all, postulate the number of firms in the industry. (Thus, 
industrial structure is given and fixed.) Secondly, they study industries 
where firms are identical. Thirdly, they restrict their analyses to symmetric 
market equilibria; that is, to equilibria in which oligopolists behave 
identically. These, for reasons we have mentioned, might well be excep- 
tional features and in what follows we will model the industry in a variety of 
manners to show that the existence of strong learning possibilities can 
indeed result in the emergence of concentration. Thus, a central purpose of 
the initial positive analysis in our paper (Section 4) is to show that 
symmetric outcomes in the presence of strong learning possibilities can be 
misleading constructs. In order to concentrate our attention on dynamic 
scale-economies occasioned by the learning phenomenon we will assume, as 
in the works of Spence and Fudenberg and Tirole, that at each date each firm 
faces constant-returns-to-scale in production. We will investigate the emer- 
gence of concentration in Section 4.2 with the help of an example where, as 
in Spence and Fundenberg and Tirole, we postulate that a given number of 
firms are engaged in quantity competition a' la Cournot. However, unlike 
the previous authors we will suppose that one of the firms possesses an 
initial cost advantage, possibly a small advantage. Our idea will be to show 
that if the scope for learning is large and if firms discount the future at a 
large rate, the initial advantage will accumulate over time in a way that will 
manifest itself in increased market share for the advantaged firm. In these 
circumstances the industry will experience growing concentration, leading 
possibly to monopoly, (Proposition 3). From the perspective of an analysis 
of the evolution of such an industry the assumption that firms are identical 
would in these circumstances be a bad one. 
Now competition is relatively sluggish when a small group of firms compete 
in quantities. In Section 5 therefore we will study the consequence of 
vigorous competition among firms facing learning curves. The obvious way 
to model this is to allow firms to compete in prices for a homogeneous 
commodity, not in quantities. This will be the form of competition assumed 
in Section 5. In fact we will be concerned with an additional issue in Section 
5, that of entry. We will begin, in Section 5.1, with the simplest case, where 
the number of firms in the industry is given. Firms will be assumed initially 
to face identical (unit) production costs. To one of them we will confer an 
advantage in the form of consumer loyalty. This will be the source of the 
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asymmetry. We will show that in dynamic equilibrium the advantaged firm 
will be the sole active firm, constrained to earn zero present-value profits. 
The analysis here will be similar in spirit to that of contestable markets (see 
Baumol, Panzer and Willig, 1982), but with an important interpretive 
difference. Since our model possesses an explicit intertemporal structure 
occasioned by learning, the flow of profits enjoyed by the monopolist will 
not be constant. It will suffer losses in the early years in order to prevent its 
rivals from producing, with an anticipation of future profits. Typically, 
profits in dynamic equilibrium will increase over time, possibly rising 
eventually to monopoly levels. 
This feature deserves emphasis. In the presence of learning a monopolist 
does not enjoy a constant flow of profits. The industry is not at a stationary 
state. It follows that the fact that at a mature stage a monopolist is seen to 
be earning positive profits is not, on its own, a reason for supposing that it 
has always done so, in particular that it has not suffered losses in the past. 
As the analysis of Section 5.1 will show, the advantaged firm in our model 
will initially price its product below (current) average production costs in 
order to assume monopoly status and reap monopoly profits later. 
A shortcoming of the model in Section 5.1 is that all firms are assumed to 
be in the industry in advance of the analysis. In Section 5.2 we will therefore 
suppose that the industry possesses a single incumbent, the advantaged firm. 
We will ask if the threat of entry by rivals limits the powers of the 
incumbent. We will note in Proposition 5 that if entry on the part of firms 
is literally free the outcome is not predictable. There are multiple equilibria, 
ranging from the one in which the incumbent behaves as an unbridled 
monopolist to that in which its profits, in present-value terms, are diluted to 
zero. We will then argue (Proposition 6) that this multiplicity is spurious: 
the introduction of a positive entry cost, no matter how small, eliminates all 
but the first as an equilibrium outcome. The invisible hand is not merely 
weak, it is paralysed. The industry is an unconstrained monopoly.4 
Sections 6-8 are concerned with (second-best) welfare economics in the 
presence of a learning curve. In Section 6 we will explore the kinds of 
intertemporal contracts which, if enforceable, would allow an industry with 
free entry to sustain a social optimum. We will identify them but will argue 
that the entire analysis breaks down if there is the smallest of entry costs. 
This then leads us to explore the effects of government regulations 
(Sections 7 and 8). Learning-by-doing introduces a classic tension in sharp 
terms: unconstrained monopoly is not desirable for society, but oligopoly 
may well be worse, because in the process of sharing a market firms learn 
less and so future prices are higher. We argue that when applied to an 
industry in which there are strong learning effects the per se doctrine may 
well be undesirable. In Section 7 we will look at a few applications of the 
4We should emphasize that the fact that even a small entry cost prevents competition from 
actually taking place when post-entry competition is expected to be fierce, is a general result, 
unconnected with learning-by-doing. (See Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1987). 
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doctrine to illustrate this.5 In Section 8 we will study a few distinguished 
types of government policy in the presence of foreign competition under 
several alternative circumstances. We will formalise a version of the 
infant-industry argument and will locate circumstances in which a temporary 
import ban leads to international Pareto improvement, (Section 8.1). 
Finally in Section 8.2 we suggest that if a foreign industry enjoys strong 
learning effects, stronger than domestic learning possibilities, and if 
domestic production costs are high, and if domestic demand for the foreign 
producer's output is a large fraction of his output, there is a case for 
temporary import subsidies. Such subsidies encourage greater foreign 
production and thus foreign learning. This in turn increases domestic 
benefits from lower import prices in the future. 
Despite the prevalence of learning-by-doing the theoretical literature on 
its economic implications remains sparse.6 Arrow (1962) and Kaldor and 
Mirrlees (1962) used variants of the idea to construct aggregate growth 
models of closed economies. In each of these contributions the economy 
was assumed to be competitive. We will, however, note below (Section 5) 
that this is a valid assumption only if firms can learn costlessly, completely 
and instantaneously from the experience of others; that is, if learning 
spillovers are complete.7 This extreme assumption cannot be taken ser- 
iously. It flies against the face of evidence. Stated briefly our positive 
analysis aims at studying the consequences on market structure of the 
phenomenon of learning. Towards this we will, in Section 3 and 4.1, study 
in turn the effect of learning on a socially managed and privately 
monopolised industry, respectively. In Section 9 we will enumerate our 
conclusions. We begin (Section 2) with terms, notations and so forth. 
2. Preliminaries 
A single homogeneous commodity can be produced by n firms, or 
production units. Firms (or production units) are labelled i, j (= 1, 2,..., n). 
The analysis that follows concerns for the main part, two production 
periods, t = 0,1. The operative restriction is, however, not 'two', but 
'finitely many', for we will note in passing that our results generalise readily 
to any finite number of periods. We want to distinguish the early, infant, 
phase of an industry from its later, mature, phase. The former is one during 
which learning is significant, the latter where in effect learning has ceased. 
5See Scherer (1980), Chapters 19 and 20, for an account of anti-trust policies in the United 
States and in Western Europe, and in particular of the per se doctrine, taken to be implicit in 
the Sherman Act of the United States. 
6For a general discussion of the issues that arise in the presence of learning-by-doing, see 
Scherer (1980), pp. 250-252. 
7To be sure, an industry containing a very large number of identical firms engaged in 
quantity competition would be approximately competitive at a symmetric Cournot equilibrium 
even if learning were firm-specific. But in this case no firm would learn much, since each would 
produce a negligible amount at each date. 
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In order to concentrate on the industry in question we take it that income 
effects are negligible. Market demand for the commodity is given in each 
period by the downward sloping demand curve p(Q), where Q is total 
output and p is the price at which the commodity is sold. (Nothing is gained 
by assuming shifting demand). Furthermore, we suppose that the p (Q) ->0 
as Q-->oc. We assume that p(Q)Q is strictly concave; that is, marginal 
industry revenue is a decreasing function of total output. 
Let c8 be the unit cost of production for firm i in the first period. For 
simplicity of exposition we take it for all i, p(O) > c' >p(oo) = 0. Learning is 
based on production experience. By writing c' for the unit cost of firm i in 
the second period (t = 1), we take it that 
cl = VlQ +,C E Ql) 
where Q8 (resp. Qj) is the output of firm i (resp. firm j) in the first period. 
Here, a? is a constant-the extent of learning spillover-and 0 - a? - 1. Since 
there is learning, we assume that c'(.) is a monotonically decreasing 
function, with c'(0) = c'. If a? = 1 learning is industry-wide and spillovers are 
complete, as in Arrow (1962), Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) and Stokey 
(1986). This is far too extreme. At the other extreme is a? = 0; which means 
that learning is firm-specific. This is a good deal less questionable. It will 
transpire that all of our analysis is invariant to a?, so long as a? < 1. 
3. Nationalized industry and departures from marginal-cost-pricing 
3.1 Fully optimal pricing 
Suppose that the industry is a nationalized one. Assume first that losses 
Q 
can be covered by general taxation. Let u(Q) = f p(Q) dQ and, without loss 
0 
of generality let the social discount rate be nil. Assume for simplicity of 
exposition that all potential units are identical. If spillovers are incomplete 
(i.e. a? < 1) there ought obviously to be only one production unit, to take 
full advantage of learning. If a? = 1 it does not matter how many production 
units there are. Therefore we may as well assume there is only one. 
The problem is then to choose Q0 and Q, (output levels at t = 0 and t = 1 
respectively) so as to maximize 
u(QO) - coQo + U(Q1) - Ci(Qo)Qi. (1) 
In what follows we will assume that this, and the monopolist's problem in 
Section 4, have bounded solutions. A sufficient condition for this is that 
c1(oo) > 0. Given this, maximisation of (1) yields the necessary conditions for 
optimality: 
p(QO) = co + c1(Qo)Qi, (2a) 
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and 
p(Q1) = Ci(Qo).8 (2b) 
Equation (2b) concerns optimal pricing policy in the mature phase. 
There is no more learning. Marginal-cost pricing is therefore the rule. But 
in the infant phase there is learning. And learning implies an intertemporal 
externality. Equation (2a) shows how to internalize this. It says that as long 
as there is a scope for learning the industry ought to price below current 
marginal cost. The industry thus makes losses in present-value terms. The 
optimal loss is covered by general taxation. 
3.2. Optimal pricing under revenue constraint 
Suppose that the industry must cover its losses over the planning horizon. 
In particular, it is to "balance its budget". Then the problem is to choose Q0 
and Q1 so as to maximize (1) subject to the constraint 
p(Qo)Qo - coQo +P(Q1)Ql - Ci(Qo)Qi l 0. (3) 
Let A denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with (3). Then, by writing 
m(Q) p'(Q)Q +p(Q)-(m(Q) is marginal revenue)-we can express the 
necessary conditions for optimality as: 
p(Qo) - co- c1(Qo)Q1 = -A[m(Qo) - co - c1(Qo)Qi] (4a) 
and 
p(Q1) - ci(Qo) = - A[m(Q1) - c1(Qo)], (4b) 
or equivalently as: 
p(Qo)[1 - AE(Qo)/(1 + A)] = co + cl(Qo)Qi (5a) 
and 
p(Q1)[1 - (Q1)/(1 + A)] = c1(Qo), (5b) 
where c(Q) = -p'(Q)Q/p(Q), is the inverse elasticity of demand. 
If the optimization problem (1) is a concave programme, constraint (3) is 
binding. In this case equations (4a)-(4b) [and equivalently (5a)-(5b)] reflect 
the Ramsey Rules for optimal departures from marginal-cost pricing. Given 
that A > 0 we can conclude at once from equation (4b) that p(Q1) > cJ(Qo), 
and therefore from (3), which is in fact an equality, that pi(Qo) <c0. In 
other words, it is desirable to price the commodity above marginal cost in 
the mature phase so as to cover the losses incurred during the infant phase 
(equation (4a)) when learning occurs. 
It is interesting to ask how the revenue constraint (3) affects optimal 
output over the two periods. Assume that c1(Qo) is sufficiently convex so 
8Primes denote derivatives. 
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Q0, Q1 / Q,(Q0) 
/~~~~ 
0 QiQo 
FIG. 1. Output levels of a nationalized industry with and without a revenue constraint. 
that (1) is concave. Note then that if in the infant phase second-best output 
is lower than first-best output it must be so in the mature phase as well. In 
fact it is simple to confirm from equations (2a)-(2b) and (4a)-(4b) that 
second-best output is indeed lower than first-best output at t = 0. Therefore 
we have 
Proposition 1: If a revenue constraint is imposed on a nationalized 
industry it will reduce output in each period. 
The content of Proposition 1 can be seen diagrammatically in Fig. 1. The 
bold curve Qo(Q1) is the solution of equation (2a), the dashed curve below 
it is the solution to equation (5a). They are thus optimal values of QO as a 
function of Q1, without and with the revenue constraint. Because of the 
greater benefit to learning, the higher is Q1, the higher is QO. Equations 
(2b) and (5b) can likewise be thought of as defining the optimal value of Q1 
for each value of Q0. They are drawn in Fig. 1, respectively, as the bold 
curve Q1(Q0) and the dashed curve below it. The higher is Q0 the lower is 
the marginal cost of production next period and therefore the larger is Q1. 
The dashed curves are below the corresponding bold curves because the 
revenue constraint implies that for each value of Q0, Q1 is reduced, and for 
each value of Q1, QO is reduced. 
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4. Cournot competition among oligopolists and the emergence of 
monopoly 
We now turn to a private industry. The simplest case to analyse is pure 
monopoly, the subject of Section 4.1. We will require the analysis for later 
purposes. In Section 4.2 we analyse Cournot-oligopolists. 
4. 1. Monopoly 
We consider a monopoly facing no threat of entry by rivals. We assume 
that the capital market is perfect and (without loss of generality) that the 
rate of interest is nil. For reasons that are identical to those we raised in the 
case of a nationalized industry we may take it that the monopolist chooses a 
single production unit. Thus, the problem is to choose QO and Q1 so as to 
maximize: 
p(QO)QO - coQo + p(Q1)Q1 - c1(QO)Q1. (6) 
This yields the necessary conditions, 
m(QO) = co + cl(Qo)Q1 (7a) 
m(QW) = c,(Qo), (7b) 
which can, equivalently, be written as 
p(Qo)[1 - C(QO)] = co + c1(Qo)Q1 (8a) 
and 
p(Q1)[1 - E(Q1)] = c1(Qo). (8b) 
Assume for the moment that c1(Qo) is sufficiently convex, so that (6) is a 
concave function. From equations (7a) and (7b) we can conclude that the 
monopolist produces more in the second period than in the first (see 
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983, p. 524). It can also be shown that a 
monopolist produces less than the first-best output level in each period (see 
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983, p. 525). The question arises whether this 
remains true if monopoly output is compared instead to output level in a 
revenue-constrained nationalized industry. To answer this note from equa- 
tions (5a)-(5b) and (8a)-(8b) that the second-best production rules are 
identical in form to the production rules of a monopolist, the difference in 
content being that the planner in the nationalized industry acts as though 
the elasticity of demand is higher. This allows us to assert 
Proposition 2: A monopoly produces less than a revenue-constrained 
nationalized industry in each period. 
From propositions 1 and 2 one notes that learning is greatest in an 
unconstrained nationalized industry. It is less in a revenue-constrained 
nationalized industry and it is least in a private monopoly. 
Two further questions arise: (A) would a monopolist ever price below 
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unit production cost so as to reduce future production cost dramatically? 
and (B) would a monopolist ever price the good in the second period in 
excess of first-period production cost? Answers to both are a 'yes' and, 
instead of seeking conditions under which the answers are a 'yes' we will 
merely formalize the questions, which will prove useful for subsequent 
exposition. 
As regards (A), define 
V(Qo) max {p(Q1)Ql - cj(Qo)Qj}. (9) Q1 
Let Q1(Qo) be the solution of (9). It follows then that 
V'(Qo) = -cl(Qo)(1(QO). 
Now let QO be the solution of the equation p(Qo) = co. At QO the gain in 
current profit due to a marginal increase in output is 
M( Q ) - co= -Coe( , ); 
and the gain in the second period's profit is V( 'o(). We conclude that the 
monopolist will price below unit cost in the first period if 
V (Qo) = -C1 QO)01(Qo) > coC(Qo), (10) 
and will price above unit cost if 
(QO) = -Cl(Qo)Ql(Qo) < Coe(Q). (11) 
(B) is easier to formalize. From equation (7a) we observe that 
m(Qo) = co + cl(Qo)Q1(Qo). (12) 
This yields the first-period output, Qm, say. In other words, second-period 
price will exceed, or will be less than, first-period production cost, as 
P 1 (Q O) > co, (13a) 
or 
P(!O,(Qom)) < co. (13b) 
4.2. Cournot duopoly 
We assume that the market lasts T + 1 periods, where T is finite, but 
possibly large. We wish to analyse competition in quantities. We may as 
well assume then that the industry is a duopoly. Extension of the analysis to 
oligopoly is routine. In order to obtain explicit solutions we assume that the 
market demand curve at each date is linear. Thus, 
p(Q) = A-BQ; A, B >0 (14) 
Furthermore, we take it that so long as production cost is positive, the 
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learning curve is linear. In short, 
Ct = max {0. Co- EQ' ), for i = 1, 2, T ? t 2 1, where / > 0 
(15) 
The learning curve embodied in (15) has two parameters, co and /3. The 
former measures the extent to which learning will prove useful and the 
latter the extent of the rate of learning possibilities. (15) captures in a sharp 
way the idea that learning ceases after finite accumulation of experience. 
Diminishing returns to learning set in very dramatically once unit cost has 
fallen to zero. 
Suppose one of the firms (say, firm 1) enjoys an initial cost advantage 
over its rival. We want to study the evolution of the industry when the firms 
behave non-cooperatively. Suppose first that T is large and that firms 
discount future profits at a low rate. Then it is clear that in equilibrium the 
disparity between the firms will vanish in the long run. The reason is that 
with finite output even the disadvantaged firm (firm 2) can reduce its 
production cost to zero. There are duopoly profits to be enjoyed from that 
point onwards. With a long horizon and a low discount rate the present- 
value of such profits is large. Clearly then it pays both firms to produce. In 
the long run market shares will equal each other. 
But what if the discount rate is large? The above argument then no longer 
applies and the disadvantaged firm (firm 2) may well choose to withdraw 
from the market gradually as the cost difference between it and its rival 
widens. Here is how this might happen. 
If the discount rate is large each firm cares mostly about current profits. 
Given that firms compete in quantities the advantaged firm (firm 1) will 
therefore produce more than its rival in the first period. Since the learning 
curve is linear, the reduction in unit cost for firm 1 will be greater than that 
for firm 2. Thus the disadvantaged firm will continue to be at a disadvan- 
tage, in fact even more disadvantaged. And so on. The problem then is to 
identify circumstances where this leads to the growth of concentration. We 
do this by studying the obvious limiting case, where firms are fully myopic; 
that is, where firms discount future profits at an infinite rate. 
Let Q' denote the (Cournot) equilibrium output of firm i (i = 1, 2) at date 
t. Assume that it is positive. Then, on using (14), routine calculations yield: 
= [A + c2 - 2c']/3B, and Q = [A + cl - 2c1]/3B (16) 
But from (15) we know that 
ci=max[c_1-/Q-1, 0] (17) 
Assume that c' is positive. Assume further that equilibrium output levels at 
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t + 1 are also positive. Then it is simple to confirm that 
Qt+i = [9B2Q1 + lA- 5/3c' + 4/3c ]/9B2 (18) 
2 
= [9B2Q2 + lA - 5/c2 + 4pcl]/9B2 
From (16) we know that Q1 > Q2 if c1 < c2 by hypothesis, Q1 and Q2 in (16) 
are both positive. It follows from this and (18) that 
Qt+ /Qt+i > Q t/Q), (19) 
if c1 < c2, or in other words, that the concentration ratio increases so long as 
there is a cost differential between the firms. 
The foregoing analysis assumes that both firms are active at both periods. 
Is it possible for the concentration ratio to go to infinity, with the 
disadvantaged firms leaving the industry? Here is an account of how this 
can happen. 
Let A = C- c > 0 denote the initial cost difference. For both of them to 
produce at the initial date it follows from (16) that A + cl > 2c2, or in other 
words that 
A-cl > 2A (20) 
Using (16) in (18) we note that 
9B2Q2 = 3B[A + cl - 2c2] + /3[A + 4cj - 5C2] (21) 
But now suppose A - cl < 5A, which is perfectly consistent with (20). Then, 
while the expression within the first pair of brackets in the right hand side of 
(21) is positive, that within the second pair of brackets is negative. If /3 is 
'large', Q2 in (21) is not positive. But this is another way of saying that the 
disadvantaged firm drops out, it ceases to produce: the cost differential is 
altogether too much in the second period. We conclude with 
Proposition 3: If firms discount the future at a high rate and the scope for 
learning is approximately constant, then so long as learning has not 
ceased an industry will display growing concentration. If the rate of 
learning is large then under certain circumstances the industry becomes a 
monopoly in the long run. 
These possibilities are shown in the phase diagrams in Figs. 2 and 3 
where, for convenience, we have assumed time to be continous. In each of 
the figures firm 1 is assumed to enjoy an initial cost advantage over its rival. 
In Fig. 2 industrial concentration increases until firm 1 ceases to learn any 
further. Firm 2 then catches up gradually-that is, industrial concentration 
declines-until it too ceases to learn. From this date the rivals produce 
constant and equal quantities for the market. 
Figure 3 depicts a different case. Here, industrial concentration increases 
all the way to an eventual monopoly. In finite time the cost differential 
becomes sufficiently large to force firm 2 to withdraw from the market. 
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FIG. 2. Evolution of market shares, 1: the persistence of duopoly. 
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FIG. 3. Evolution of market shares, 2: the emersisence of monopoly. 
Q.1 . E arke strctur / // // 
/ 
/ 




weG 3.Eoltoao aketi htlerigi fim shaesi' A:th eachgence thefim arenopoly. 
9'The analysis readily generalises to many periods. 
10 It is easy to confirm that the arguments readily generalise to the case where there is 
spillover in learning, so long as it is not complete. The analysis of this section is thus valid for 
0 --:: ar < 1. 
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in price competition a la Bertrand. Since they produce identical goods the 
firm setting the lower price captures the entire market. The question of how 
they share the market when they charge the same price is more delicate. For 
technical reasons (see footnote 11 below) we will make the seemingly 
awkward assumption that one of the firms (say firm 1) gets to supply the 
entire market should the firms set the same price. It would, on the face of it, 
seem more reasonable to assume that the firms divide the market, say 
evenly, in the case of a tie (see Section 7). But we want to introduce an 
asymmetry among firms and some such notion as a form of "consumer 
loyalty" is one way of doing it." 
In what follows we do not suppose that the monopoly profit function, 
expression (6), is necessarily concave. In order, then to characterise 
(subgame perfect) equilibrium in this market, define 
Qi(Qo) arg max [p(Ql) - cl(Qo)Q1], subject to p(Q1) c0.'2 (22) 
Q1 
Next, define Q* as the largest solution of the zero-profit condition 
p(Qo)Qo - coQo +P(Ql*(Qo))Qr*(Qo) - c1(Qo)Ql*(Qo) = 0.13 (23) 
It is now a simple matter to confirm 
Proposition 4: The duopoly market possesses a unique subgame-perfect 
equilibrium. In equilibrium the advantaged firm (firm 1) charges p(Q*) 
and p(Qj (QO)) for its product at dates t = 0 and t = 1, respectively, and 
serves the entirely market. The rival charges p (Q ) and co for its product 
at the two dates and produces nothing. 
Competition from the rival drives the maximum profits of the advantaged 
firm to zero. But notice that (22) and (23) imply p(Q ) < co. In other words 
the advantaged firm is forced to incur losses at the infant stage. If the price 
constraint in (22) is not binding the producer earns monopoly profits at the 
mature stage. 
5.2. Potential competition 
What is the effect of potential competition on an incumbent's behaviour? 
To analyse this we alter the structure of the previous model and assume that 
before the duopoly game is played the rival is not in the industry. The 
incumbent, by definition, is. Whether the rival enters is a matter to be 
11 If a 50-50 sharing rule is postulated an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. But an 
e-equilibrium in pure strategies does exist and, in fact, the equilibria we will compute in this 
section of the paper with the asymmetric sharing rule are approximately the same as 
e-equilibrium with the symmetric sharing rule (See Section 6). 
12 Q*(Qo) is a function-not a correspondence-because of our assumption that (gross) 
current revenue is strictly concave in output. 
13 Equation (23) may have multiple solutions, since (6) is not necessarily a concave function 
of Q0 and Q1. 
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deduced. First period unit production cost for the incumbent is co. Should 
the rival enter in the first period it too can produce at unit cost co. If it does 
not enter, by definition it cannot compete in the market. As before, 
learning is firm specific. 
Entry is free. But we suppose that exit is prohibited. (The reader can 
easily calculate the consequences of making exist costless.) Moreover, the 
rival has the option of entering in the second period should it not enter in 
the first. (It can, to be sure, choose never to enter.) The moves are thus as 
follows. The rival decides first whether to enter. Should it enter, the two 
engage in price competition thereafter and in each period each of the firms 
supplies the demand the market makes of it. (We take it that the incumbent 
captures the entire market at any date the firms set the same price. The 
motivation behind our imposing this asymmetry is no different from the one 
in Section 5.1). If, on the other hand, the rival does not enter the incumbent 
is free to act as a monopolist. However, the rival has the option of entering 
at the start of the second period. Should it choose to enter, the two then 
engage in price competition. (But note that in this case the rival suffers from 
a cost disadvantage, since its unit cost of production is still co.)14 If the rival 
refrains from entering even in the second period the incumbent is free to act 
as a monopolist once again. 
The central result, which is as simple to prove as Proposition 4, is this. 
Proposition 5: If entry is free the market possesses three subgame-perfect 
equilibria: 
(i) an instant-entry equilibrium, where the rival enters at once; 
(ii) a delayed-entry equilibrium, where the rival enters at the start of the 
second period; and 
(iii) a no-entry equilibrium. 
The rival earns nothing and produces nothing in any equilibrium. The 
incumbent can rank equilibria, preferring most of all (iii) and least of all (i), 
where it earns nothing. 
We now proceed to characterize equilibrium, and the resulting profits the 
firms earn in each equilibrium. To do this, define 
Qo**=-max [arg max [p(Qo)Qo - coQo Q0 
+P(Ql*(Qo))Ql*(Qo) - Ci(Qo)Ql*(Qo)] (24) 
where Q* (Qo) is defined in (22). Next, denote as Q' and Q7 the solution 
14 Bhattacharya (1984) analyses a contrasting case, where the potential entrant can invest to 
reduce its production cost prior to entry. 
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of equations (8a) and (8b)-monopoly output levels in the two periods. It is 
then simple to confirm that at the no-entry equilibrium the incumbent's 
strategy is to charge p(Q ) for its product in the first period and announce 
its intention to charge p(Qr) in the second period should the rival not enter 
and charge p(Q*(Q')) should the rival choose to enter. At the no-entry 
equilibrium the rival does not enter and so the incumbent earns monopoly 
profits. 
Similarly, it is simple to confirm that at the delayed-entry equilibrium the 
incumbent sets its price equal to p(Q**) in the first period and announces 
its intention of charging p(Q7(Q**)) in the second period should the rival 
enter in the second period and to charge the second period monopoly price 
should the rival not enter. The rival's strategy is to enter in the second 
period and charge co. Finally, the strategies supporting the instant-entry 
equilibrium are identical to those described in Proposition 4. The remaining 
parts of Proposition 5 are equally simple to confirm.'5 
How is the analysis affected if the number of periods exceeds two? Not 
much. If there are T periods, and if learning never ceases, then with free 
entry there are T + 1 subgame-perfect equilibria in each of which the rival 
earns nothing, as in Proposition 5, and which can be ranked by the 
incumbent, with the no-entry equilibrium being the most preferred one. 
We conclude therefore that potential entry is not potent enough to ensure 
that the incumbent's profits are driven to zero. In fact however one suspects 
that the no-entry equilibrium is the only one which should command our 
attention, a suspicion which is confirmed if we assume that entry is not 
costless. So we suppose that the rival must incur a (sunk) cost, k(> 0) in 
order to enter. We can now easily confirm 
Proposition 6: The market possesses a unique equilibrium if the rival has 
to bear a cost for entry. In equilibrium the rival does not enter and the 
incumbent acts as an unconstrained monopolist.16 
Proposition 6 displays in a sharp form the idea that an initial advantage can 
be decisive in the long run. The sharpness is due to the postulate of price 
competition among firms involved in the production of a homogeneous 
commodity. If the commodities are not homogeneous one would require a 
non-negligible entry cost to eliminate all equilibria other than the one in 
which the rival never enters. 
15 If inequality (13b) holds, then in terms of profits to the incumbent there is no difference 
between the delayed-entry and no-entry equilibria, because in this case the constraint in (14) is 
not binding when Q' = Q0. If on the other hand (13a) holds this is not so, and the incumbent 
earns less at a delayed-entry equilibrium. 
16 Speaking formally, a small entry cost is a means by which one can eliminate what are really 
implausible equilibria. In our present model it eliminates the instant-entry and the delayed- 
entry strategies on the part of the rival as equilibrium strategies. It serves much the same role 
as would certain types of "trembling-hand" on the part of the incumbent. 
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6. Long term contracts 
The discussion in the previous section has established two central points. 
First, in the presence of entry costs potential competition poses no threat to 
an incumbent when, as in our model, post-entry competition is expected to 
be fierce. (The more fierce post-entry competition is expected to be, the 
smaller is the entry cost that is sufficient to act as a barrier to entry). 
Second, even the zero-profit outcome of the instant-entry equilibrium has 
nothing obvious to commend it; it would not sustain the revenue- 
constrained optimum of Section 3.2. We now take up this second point, and 
see that what prevents the instant entry equilibrium from achieving the 
revenue-constrained optimum is an absence of long term contracts. In the 
next section we will look at the policy implications of the first point. In what 
follows we return to the two-period construct. 
Suppose, as in Section 5.1, that both firms are already in the market. 
Next suppose that individuals can sign long-term contracts. A firm would 
then offer an individual price quotations for both periods, and the customer 
would agree (and this would be a binding agreement) to accept delivery 
of so many units in the first period and so many in the second. The firm 
offering the best contract would presumably attract all the customers. We 
now have to specify the game. We may, as in the previous section, suppose 
that the firms move simultaneously. In which case we need to assume either 
that one of the firms is privileged and gets the whole market whenever they 
offer the same contract, or that one of the firms is not an optimizer but is 
satisfied so long as it is in the neighbourhood of maximum profit. 
(Otherwise there is no equilibrium in pure strategies.) Alternatively we may 
follow the contestability theory route and award one of the firms the first 
move, the other firm being the follower. In what follows we continue to 
assume that firms move simultaneously and award one of the firms the 
entire market in case of a tie. 
Suppose that all consumers are identical. They therefore agree on what is 
the best contract. If firms can charge non-linear prices the full optimum of 
Section 3.1 will be sustained at an equilibrium. Each firm would offer to sell 
the commodity at prices given by equations (2a) and (2b) and in addition 
charge a fixed-fee just large enough to ensure that profits are zero. If 
non-linear prices are not feasible, market equilibrium would sustain the 
revenue-constrained optimum of Section 3.2. Here, firms would offer the 
Ramsey prices given by equations (5a) and (Sb). 
Such long term contracts do not generally exist. But were they to exist 
they would themselves represent a barrier to further entry for firms who 
happen subsequently to develop a new and better process of manufacture, 
or produce a better quality product. In addition, one must not overlook the 
fact that the signing of such contracts entails some (sunk) costs, and this, as 
we noted in Section 5.3, is an important barrier to entry! We are then back 
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with Proposition 6: entry costs, however small, are a barrier to actual 
competition. 
What are then the policy implications of this for an industry where there 
is learning-by-doing? We turn to this. 
7. The per se doctrine 
Anti-trust policies have taken a wide variety of forms. But they would all 
appear to flow from a common attitude, that if there is a single large firm in 
an industry it must per se be bad. Unless there is complete spillover in 
learning this attitude is questionable, because the industry is a natural 
monopoly when spillovers are less than complete and if there are insufficient 
diminishing return in each firm. If learning effects are significant monopoly 
is not necessarily the worst form of market structure. Duopoly (or oligopoly) 
outcomes may be worse for society: the infant phase of an industry may be 
prolonged. We conclude that a ruling which sets an upper limit to the share 
of the market that any single firm can enjoy may be deleterious. 
The foregoing discussion addressed the possibility of welfare loss due to 
the dismantling of a monopoly. We turn next to another kind of anti-trust 
ruling that can reduce welfare. This is when the government considers a firm 
to be engaged in predatory behaviour if it prices its product below it current 
marginal cost. Now, we have noted in Section 3 that a monopolist, even 
when unconcerned about entry, may charge a price lower than current 
marginal cost (condition (10)). The question is whether the regulatory 
authorities can obtain information that allows it to distinguish predatory 
pricing from monopoly pricing in the presence of strong learning effects. If 
they cannot, and they force the monopolist to charge co in the first period, 
entry would still be deterred if there is a small entry cost. So the industry 
would remain a monopoly, the monopolist would earn lower profits and 
would charge a higher price in both periods. (In the second period also, 
because there would then be less learning.) The policy in question hurts all. 
8. Trade policies 
8.1. An infant industry argument 
The infant-industry argument begins, for the most part, with the 
assumption that foreign producers are competitive and that in particular, 
learning has ceased among them. So let c be the foreign unit production 
cost. Assuming transport costs to be nil this is then the world price for the 
commodity. As before, let co be the domestic producer's unit production 
cost in the first period and c1(Qo) its unit cost in the second period when QO 
is its initial output. To have a pertinent problem we take it that co > c and 
that there exists some Q > 0 such that c1(Q) < c for all Q - Q. We denote 
domestic demand in each period by the function Pd(Q) and world demand 
in each period by the function pw(Q). 
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We take it that there is a single domestic firm. (Proposition 6 provides a 
justification for this.) Will it be active if there is no government interven- 
tion? It will, if it can earn positive present-value of profits despite the 
presence of the competitive foreign sector. To formalise this, write 
jr max [pw(Qo)Qo - c0Q0 +pw(Q1)Ql - c1(Qo)Q1] 
Qo,Qi 
subject to pw(Q0),pw(Q1) < c (25) 
The domestic firm will certainly produce, and indeed monopolise the 
world market-through limit pricing perhaps-if ,r > 0. It will not produce at 
all if ,r < 0. So let us assume the latter. Is there then a case for government 
intervention? 
Rather than explore optimum government policies we will in what 
follows, ask under what condition a temporary protection, in the form of 
import ban, is desirable. For simplicity we will consider the case where an 
import ban is imposed as an infant protection.17 
Let Qd be the solution of Pd(Q) = E. Since ,r <0 we note that under 
laissez-faire domestic welfare, S, is 
S = 2[ud(Qd) - CQd], where Ud(Q)= Pd(Q) dQ (26) 
0 
If an infant-industry protection is offered to the domestic firm it is not 
constrained by the international price when it produces for the domestic 
market. Without loss of generality we can assume that the firm does not find 
it in its interest to compete in the international market in its infant phase. In 
its mature phase it may, of course, wish to compete. If it does, it will 
monopolise the world market. Naturally, we will consider the case where it 
will wish to monopolise the world market in the second period. Thus write 
fr max [Pd(QO)QO - cOQO +Pw(Ql)Ql - c1(Q0)Q1] 
Qo,Q1 
subject to pw(Ql) S E. (27) 
Notice that Yr may be positive even when 7r is negative. It follows from (27) 
that the home producer can be coaxed into activity by a temporary import 
ban if r > 0. In this situation the domestic producer during infancy serves 
only the home market and monopolises the world market when it matures. 
But does the import ban increase welfare when compared to free trade? It 
can. To see when this is so, let Q0 and Q1 be the solution of (27) and 
consider circumstances where the constraint in (27) is not binding; that is 
pw(Q1) <c. Thus there are gains to domestic purchasers in the second 
period as a consequence of this protection, and this may be sufficient to 
warrant the protection. Formally, define Qd =pJ1(pw(Q1)) to be domestic 
17 We could as well study the desirability of a domestic production subsidy during infancy. 
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sales in the mature phase following infant-industry protection. Then 
domestic welfare, S, under protection, is 
3 = Ud(QO) - coQo + Ud(Q1)-ci(Qo)Q ? [vw(Q1) - - 
(28) 
Since Q1> Qd, there are circumstances where S > S; that is, where the 
temporary import ban is better for the domestic economy than is laissez- 
faire. But p,(Q1) <E. It follows that foreign consumers also gain in the 
second period as a result of the protective policy. We conclude that the 
import ban is a Pareto improvement. 
All this assumes that the domestic monopoly is unable to sign long term 
contracts with domestic consumers. If it could, there would be no need for 
infant protection, because the infant could look after itself. It is when for 
whatever reason such contracts cannot be implemented that the case for 
government intervention arises. In our example consumers stand to gain in 
the second period from entry by the infant, but the infant cannot 
appropriate the benefits. So under free-trade profits are negative for the 
infant. An import ban allows consumers to pay for their second period gains 
in the first period. We are not claiming that an import ban is a second-best. 
We have merely sought the kinds of consideration which make a ban an 
improvement on free trade. 
8.2. Foreign learning and import subsidies 
Thus far a variant of the classical infant industry argument. But it is not 
unusual for a home country to face a foreign monopoly which is still 
learning. Should the home government encourage domestic production? 
The answer depends on several factors. If the domestic industry faces a 
learning curve as well and, in particular, if domestic learning possibilities 
are strong there is an argument in favour not dissimilar to the one we have 
outlined in the previous sub-section. In addition, dependence on the foreign 
monopoply means that such profits as occur in the home market are 
repatriated abroad. As against this, we have to recognize that with an 
international duopoly both firms learn less. This affects domestic welfare. 
Consider the case where domestic production is far too costly. The 
commodity has then to be imported from the foreign monopolist. Suppose, 
to highlight the point we wish to make, the foreign monopoly is a 
nationalised firm. Its production plan is based on national welfare and does 
not include the welfare of the importing country. It follows that from the 
point of view of the latter there will be insufficient learning. An import 
subsidy suggests itself. If learning effects are strong enough and the 
importing country large enough a judicious subsidy on imports would coax 
greater production from the foreign monopoly and thus lower future prices 
sufficient to justify it.18 
18 Gatsios (1987) has developed a detailed analysis of this possibility and of the desirability of 
customs unions in the presence of scale-economies in production. 
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Often, one sees trade among differentiated products. Learning, as we 
have seen, provides a reason why a firm inolved in production is a natural 
monopoly. If countries are more or less equally placed in terms of the 
ability to learn from the production of these differentiated goods there is a 
case for each country specialising in some variety (possibly more than one 
variety). The consideration outlined in the previous paragraph implies that 
each nation ought in addition to offer an import subsidy on each variety it 
imports, as part of a mutual agreement within a Customs Union. 
9. Conclusions 
Learning-by-doing implies dynamic scale economies in production. It 
involves a form of sunk cost. Production during the infant phase assumes 
partially the role of investment. Such sunk costs are discretionary. In this 
paper we have analysed the implications of learning on the structure, 
conduct and performance of an industry. Apart from any details that may 
be of interest our main findings can be summarized as: 
(1) There is a tendency towards the emergence of dominant firms-and 
thus concentration-when learning possibilities are powerful. This is so 
even when there is competition among rivals of near-equal strength. 
(2) If the market is "contestable" the present-value of profits earned by the 
dominant firm is negligible. But because of learning, time enters in an 
essential way. Early losses incurred by the dominant firm are matched 
by subsequent profits. Data on profits earned in the mature stage are 
therefore not a reliable guide to the underlying characteristics of the 
industry. 
(3) The presence of small entry costs can ensure that the industry is a pure 
monopoly; that is, such costs can render potential competition totally 
ineffective. 
(4) The per se doctrine is questionable when learning effects are powerful. 
It may well be suboptimal to set a predetermined share of the market as 
an upper limit for the incumbent. 
(5) During the learning phase even a protected private monopolist may 
wish to price its product below its current unit production cost. Thus if 
an incumbent firm does price its product below production costs it does 
not follow that it is engaged in predatory pricing. 
(6) A large importing country may find it in its interest to impose import 
subsidies if the foreign learning curve is steep and if domestic 
production costs are high. 
And finally, 
(7) There are circumstances in which the traditional infant industry 
argument is valid; that is, in which welfare is higher with an import ban 
than with free trade. 
University of Cambridge 
Princeton University 
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